Protecting Washington’s swine herd from African swine fever

By Dr. Amber Itle, Washington State veterinarian

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious viral pig disease. It can spread very quickly in pig populations through direct or indirect contact. There is no vaccine or treatment available. ASF is considered a foreign animal disease in the U.S., and if detected would likely eliminate completely our entire export market for an unknown amount of time. ASF would affect the 76 million pigs in the US Swine herd and cost the United States an estimated $50 billion to eradicate. One of the biggest risk factors for introduction of ASF into the U.S. is the importation of the virus in smuggled meat products and garbage-feeding those products to pigs. The virus is known to persist for months.

SourceTime ASF survives
Blood in environment15 weeks
Soiled pig pens4 weeks
Blood on wooden boards10 weeks
Feces11 days
Boned meat at 39 C21 weeks
Salted dried hams20 weeks
Chilled meat15 weeks
Cured "pharma hams"42 weeks
Frozen carcass15 years

What’s happening around the world?

Since 2021, ASF has been reported in 50 countries around the globe, affecting more than 944,000 domestic pigs and 27,000 wild boars with more than 1,450,000 animal losses (deaths plus animals killed and disposed of) according to  the World Organization of Animal Health. In July 2021, ASF was first reported in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, the closest the virus has been to the continental United States in decades.

In order to protect the United States commercial pork industry, USDA APHIS has been focusing on seven key areas for ASF eradiation in the Dominican Republic including 1) biocontainment, 2) laboratory diagnostics, 3) surveillance design and implementation, 4) incident command, 5) biosecurity, 6) movement controls, and 7) compensation. Although USDA APHIS has been able to rapidly provide expertise, diagnostic support, and funding for eradication, the virus is persisting.

The response has been plagued with political complexities, civil unrest, and illegal immigration. Recent efforts to increased response personnel to mitigate illegal boat landing (IBLs) in the Dominican Republic has showcased concerns about illegal transportation of pork products which are likely carriers of the virus. On average, illegal boats carry 30-40 people with 30-50 pounds of pork or pork products that are known to harbor the virus. The concern here is there are a large number of IBLs in the Northwest corner of the Dominican Republic, which also has the largest concentration of active garbage feeding operations in the Dominican Republic. Currently, USDA APHIS is testing 36 garbage feeding operations every 6 months in the Virgin Islands, but it has not been enough to curb the spread.

To complicate the situation further, there are many feral/domestic swine on the loose across the Dominican Republic. Although Wildlife Services is trying to lethally remove feral swine in the country, the largest populations are concentrated in urban centers. As a result of political complexities, demographics, feeding practices, and feral swine, surveillance and control activities have also been somewhat limited and extremely difficult. The situation in Haiti is likely even worse.

What is WSDA doing to prevent and prepare for ASF in Washington?

Washington is considered a small swine state with an estimated 5,000 breeding sows and approximately 18,000 exhibition swine. With the onset of COVID and the real concern about food insecurity, we saw an uptick in swine imports into the state. WSDA reports an average of 3,330 swine imports into the state per year from approximately 23 different states. Swine herd demographics in Washington are unique with large numbers of small, niche, backyard hobby farms that may have few numbers of pigs but large numbers of premises, making pigs hard to track during a foreign animal disease outbreak. Washington is also a port state with SeaTac reporting 4.4 million international travelers in 2022. The interstate movement of swine and the potential for international travelers bringing pork products into our state is a concern and WSDA has been taking steps to prevent and prepare for ASF in Washington.

  1. Prohibit garbage feeding — Feeding meat or meat products to pigs, known as “garbage feeding,” is an extremely high-risk practice for spreading both ASF and foot and mouth disease. Washington will return to the legislature again this year to submit another request to prohibit garbage feeding to pigs in the state. Twenty-six other states in the country already prohibit the practice.
  2. Mandatory individual identification of swine — Being able to track swine movement both intra and interstate is critical to our mission to detect, contain, and eradicate diseases to protect the economic viability of swine production in Washington and across the United States. This year, WSDA updated language in 16-80 WAC Official Identification of Swine to state: “All swine that leave the farm of origin or move through a public livestock market or collection facility and all exhibition swine, must have official USDA-approved identification unless going direct to slaughter.”
  3. Increased surveillance — Pigs with ASF can be difficult to detect as clinical signs can be nonspecific, including high fever, decreased appetite, weakness, red, blotchy skin, diarrhea and vomiting, and coughing and difficulty breathing. WSDA works closely with WSU Washington Animal Diagnostic Laboratory, an approved National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) member, to pay for testing for all pigs submitted with clinical signs consistent with ASF. WSDA will also respond to any reports of suspicious lesions and send a field veterinarian trained as a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician to do an epidemiological investigation at no cost to the producer or veterinarian.
  4. Secure Pork Supply Plans — Both WSDA and WSU Vet Med extension are working with pork producers to develop Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Continuity of Business Plans to voluntarily prepare before an outbreak. This will better position pork premises with animals that have no evidence of infection to limit exposure of their animals through enhanced biosecurity, move animals to processing or another pork production premises under a movement permit issued by regulatory officials, and maintain business continuity for the swine industry, including producers, haulers, and packers during an outbreak. Contact Dr. Craig McConnel (cmcconnel@wsu.edu) or Dr. Mindy Buswell (mbuswell@agr.wa.gov) for more information.
  5. Planning and preparedness activities — This year WSDA veterinarians and staff are participating in several exercises in an effort to help us plan for and be ready to detect, contain, and eradicate any detection of ASF in the state. This year we will actively participate in exercises across the spectrum of International (Feral Swine, Animal/Wildlife Health Tabletop Exercise with Canada), Interstate (Oregon African Swine Fever Tabletop and Spring Fever exercises), and Intrastate (National Pork Board – ASF functional exercise). In addition, our WSDA Emergency Response Program lead by Erin Coyle received NADPRP funding to develop, enhance, and exercise State/Tribal Animal Disease Emergency Response Plans through two efforts 1) Foreign Animal Disease Mitigation and Response Preparedness Exercise Series ($326,057), and 2) Development of a Western States Agriculture Mitigation and Response Consortium ($178,068).

African swine fever is likely to remain a threat for the unforeseeable future for Washington and the United States. Stay vigilant, Squeal on Pigs, and report any concerns to WSDA to protect our pigs!

Resources on ASF: WOAH, Pork checkoff , USDA APHIS

From WOAH SITUATION REPORT 37

 OutbreaksCasesLosses*
Domestic pigsWild boarDomestic pigsWild boarDomestic pigs
Africa206018,213017,811
Americas27809,957018,857
Asia6741,28467,5131,962374,392
Europe2,77115,614849,23625,8031,039,073
Oceania00000
Total3,92916,898944,91927,7651,450,133
*Losses (deaths + animals killed and disposed of): this figure refers to losses in the establishments affected by the outbreaks and it does not include the animals culled in areas around the outbreak for controlling the disease.